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Abstract 37 
Background: In a 2015 point prevalence study, Clostridioides difficile 027, a hypervirulent 38 
ribotype, was absent from healthcare institutions in Switzerland. In late 2016, we detected an 39 
outbreak of C. difficile infection (CDI) with ribotype 027 occurring across several hospitals in the 40 
same hospital network.  41 
Methods: The first cases of CDI due to ribotype 027 triggered an outbreak investigation, 42 
including whole genome sequencing (WGS) to identify outbreak strains.  43 
Findings: We identified 28 patients with CDI caused by ribotype 027 between December 2016 44 
and December 2017, out of which twenty were caused by a single clone. Commonalities among 45 
these patients were hospitalization in the same room r on the same ward, receiving care from the 46 
same healthcare workers, and shared toilet areas. In addition to the epidemiological links 47 
suggesting possible transmission pathways between cases, WGS confirmed the clonality of this 48 
C. difficile 027 outbreak. The outbreak was contained by isolation precautions, raising awareness 49 
among healthcare workers, harmonizing diagnostic algorithms, and switching to a sporicidal 50 
agent for environmental disinfection. Of note, neith r default gowning and gloving nor 51 
handwashing with water and soap were implemented. 52 
Conclusions: This C. difficile 027 outbreak was recognized belatedly due to lack of screening for 53 
this ribotype in some hospitals, and was contained by a swift response with simple infection 54 
prevention measures and adapting the laboratory appro ch. In order to have a better 55 
understanding of C. difficile epidemiology, diagnostic approaches should be standardized, CDI 56 
declared notifiable, and longitudinal data on preval nt ribotypes collected in countries where this 57 
is not established. 58 
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Introduction 59 
Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) is a common healthcare-associated infection and often 60 
causes outbreaks. These outbreaks can be difficult to manage because transmission not only 61 
occurs via contact but also through the environment, where C. difficile spores may survive for 62 
extended periods of time [1]. Certain ribotypes of C. difficile have been found to be more virulent 63 
and more likely to sporulate than others. The ribotype 027/NAP1/B1 is considered the most 64 
prominent hypervirulent ribotype [2]. It first came to attention in 2000 when an outbreak with 65 
unusually poor clinical outcomes was reported from Philadelphia [3]. Since then, C. difficile 027 66 
has caused numerous outbreaks in healthcare setting around the world and is feared both for its 67 
effect on mortality and the increased risk of recurrent CDI in affected patients [4]. Accordingly, 68 
the knowledge on how to best prevent CDI cases and outbreaks has been assembled in practice 69 
guidelines such as in the HAI compendium by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of 70 
America (SHEA) [5].  71 
In a 2015 point-prevalence study, Clostridioides difficile 027 was absent from healthcare 72 
institutions in Switzerland [6], although rare cases had been reported previously [7]. Within one 73 
week in December 2016, we detected three unrelated cases of patients affected by C. difficile 027 74 
in our university hospital. Subsequently, an outbreak of C. difficile 027 occurred across several 75 
hospitals in the same network, which continued until December 2017. Here, we report on this 76 
outbreak, and how we investigated and managed it. A special focus is placed on the lean 77 
intervention measures used to halt the outbreak. 78 
 79 
 80 
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Methods 81 
In December 2016, our central microbiology laboratory identified a potential hypervirulent C. 82 
difficile 027. Within four days, two other patients were found to be affected, and an outbreak 83 
investigation was started, including a detailed line list and an epidemic curve.  84 
Case definitions 85 
All patients from our hospital group with stool samples indicative for C. difficile 027 (see section 86 
on laboratory analysis) were included in this outbreak report, without any exclusion criteria, 87 
resulting in 28 patients since December 2016. Twenty patients were affected by the outbreak 88 
clone, as confirmed by WGS. 89 
Setting 90 
Our hospital group consists of a 950-bed tertiary care hospital, a city hospital, three regional 91 
hospitals, and a rehabilitation clinic, together caring for approximately 60,000 inpatients per year, 92 
and with a catchment area of approximately 1,000,000 inhabitants. Patients are transferred to 93 
another site within the hospital group according to their medical needs. Each hospital has its own 94 
staff, which are not shared with other sites. 95 
Infection control measures 96 
We noticed that initially, some of the laboratories within our hospital group only used a rapid 97 
enzyme immunoassay for the detection of C. difficile toxins A and B. These assays do not 98 
identify putative ribotype 027 strains. Therefore, starting the third week of the outbreak, all stool 99 
samples with a positive screening test for C. difficile were analyzed in the central lab using a PCR 100 
method that indicates hypervirulent strains (Figure 1).  101 
In addition to the standard of care requiring contact isolation and a separate restroom for every 102 
patient with diarrhoea, known case patients were admitted to single rooms only. Rooms of 103 
affected patients were disinfected with a sporicidal agent (Pentapotassium 104 
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bis(peroxymonosulphate) bis(sulphate), Perform1%™, Schuelke, Hamburg, Germany) upon 105 
patient discharge. Despite these measures, additional patients tested positive, and fomites of some 106 
of those rooms were suspected to be the source of ongoing transmission. Therefore, isolation 107 
precautions and cleaning procedures were stepped up: 1) Sporicidal cleaning of rooms of C. 108 
difficile 027 positive patients was performed once daily; 2) Wards with more than two affected 109 
patients and therefore suspicion of transmission were at one time cleaned entirely with sporicidal 110 
agents, starting the third week of the outbreak.  111 
Daily contact between the teams from the affected wards and the infection prevention team 112 
ensured understanding of the need for enhanced preventive measures and may have led to 113 
improved compliance with hand hygiene. The division chiefs and head nurses of the entire 114 
hospital group were notified of the outbreak and an information sheet on infection control 115 
measures for this pathogen was distributed by e-mail. In addition, clinicians were encouraged to 116 
test for C. difficile in any patient with new onset of diarrhoea during hospitalization, which 117 
resulted in a 31% increase of tests for C. difficile in the third month of the outbreak.  118 
Thus, our lean intervention bundle consisted of three elements: 1) ensuring that patients were 119 
correctly diagnosed by harmonizing the lab approach nd promoting C. difficile testing in all 120 
patients with diarrhoea; 2) daily ward rounds by the IPC team to raise awareness of the 121 
importance of hand hygiene using alcohol-based solutions; and 3) sporicidal environmental 122 
cleaning.   123 
Laboratory analysis 124 
In the tertiary care hospital of the group, stool samples are screened for C. difficile using 125 
glutamate dehydrogenase ELISA (GDH ELISA; C-DIFF CHEK-60 ®, Techlab, Blacksburg VA, 126 
USA), followed by real-time PCR for toxins and suspected hypervirulence (GeneXpert® C.127 
difficile, Cepheid, Sunnyvale CA). A combination of positive toxin B gene, tcdC∆117 deletion (a 128 
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regulator gene of toxin synthesis), and positive binary toxin gene, is highly suspect of the 027 129 
ribotype. However, in the other four hospitals of our group, stool samples were initially only 130 
tested for the presence of Clostridioides toxin A and B (Immunocard Toxins A&B, Meridian 131 
Bioscience Inc., Memphis TN, USA), without any further analysis. As this approach does not 132 
detect potential ribotype 027, from the third week of the outbreak on, all stool samples that 133 
screened positive for C. difficile were analyzed in the main microbiology laboratory using 134 
GeneXpert®. Stool samples suspected to contain C. difficile 027 were sent for culture, ribotyping 135 
and whole genome sequencing (MiSeq, Illumina, San Diego CA, USA) to the University 136 
Hospital Basel, starting December 2016.  137 
PCR-ribotyping was performed using high-resolution capillary gel-based electrophoresis [8] as 138 
described elsewhere [9]. Capillary electrophoresis used the ABI-3500 Genetic Analyzer (Applied 139 
Biosystems [Life Technologies], Foster City, CA). Fragments were analysed using GeneMapper 140 
v 5.0 (Applied Biosystems) and Bionumerics v 7.6.2 (Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-Latem, 141 
Belgium) software to compare fragment profiles against the standard set of the ECDC Brazier 142 
strain collection of PCR ribotypes, obtained from the European Clostridium difficile infection 143 
study network (ECDIS-NET). 144 
Whole-Genome Sequencing 145 
All suspected 28 C. difficile 027 isolates underwent DNA extraction using EZ1 Advanced XL 146 
(Qiagen, Hilden, Germany), except for one sample which did not show growth. Resulting DNA 147 
was sequenced on the Illumina MiSeq (300 bp paired end reads) or NextSeq (150 bp paired end 148 
reads) platforms following Nextera XT or Nexteraflex library creation. The genome of isolate 149 
CdBe2 was assembled in CLC Genomics Workbench 9.5.3 giving 575 contigs totalling 4.2Mb. 150 
All data were mapped within CLC Genomics Workbench 12.0.3 against this reference genome 151 
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giving mean read depth over 52x in all cases but one (37x). All WGS data is available from the 152 
European Nucleotide Archive (https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/) under project PRJEB37809.  153 
Ethical considerations 154 
Given the fact that this outbreak investigation was conducted as part of the portfolio of duties by 155 
our intervention prevention unit and considered quality assurance, institutional review board 156 
approval was not required. 157 
 158 
Results 159 
Outbreak description 160 
The first detection of a potential ribotype 027 in stool samples of three patients within one week 161 
triggered an outbreak investigation. Infections with the outbreak clone affected twenty patients, 162 
with a mean age of 77 years (range, 56 to 88 years); ll were inpatients, and all had received 163 
antibiotics before presenting with CDI. Three patients (15%) died as a result of the infection; a 164 
fourth patient died of sepsis of unknown cause two weeks after in-patient treatment for CDI. 165 
Three patients (15%) suffered from relapses (in total, seven episodes), requiring five 166 
readmissions for colitis in two of those patients. One patient was treated with two fecal 167 
microbiome transplantations from her son, as relapss occurred despite several courses of 168 
antibiotic treatment. The subsequent length of stayw s 13 days once CDI had been diagnosed 169 
(median; range 7.25 to 20 days), compared to an overall average stay of 6 days in our hospital 170 
group. 171 
Four out of five hospitals of our hospital group were involved in the outbreak, across eleven 172 
individual wards. We noted clustering of cases, with one specific ward in hospital A witnessing 173 
six patients and another ward in hospital B having seven patients, with few patients being 174 
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transferred between hospitals. A spatio-temporal investigation revealed shared restrooms, shared 175 
rooms and care provided by the same healthcare workers as the most likely sources of 176 
transmission. Being admitted to the same ward as a CDI patient, but not the same area within that 177 
ward, for a time-period of only 20 hours proved sufficient for transmission in one case. However, 178 
for a few patients, the transmission route could not be established, e.g., one patient had no other 179 
feature in common with a symptomatic patient other an having a cardiac ultrasound performed 180 
using the same equipment a few hours later. Certain other institutions use the Bern University 181 
microbiology laboratory for processing their samples; the revised algorithm allowed us to detect 182 
one further case in a regional hospital outside our network. This patient had never visited our 183 
hospital network before being diagnosed with CDI, but was transferred to one of our 184 
rehabilitation clinics afterwards. 185 
Most cases were detected within a three-month period after the beginning of the outbreak. In our 186 
hospital network, no new infections due to this strain were identified after December 2017, and 187 
this remains the case as of July 15th, 2020 (Figure 1).  188 
Outbreak strain characterization by WGS 189 
In all stool samples highly suspect of ribotype 027 by GeneXpert®, this hypervirulent ribotype 190 
was confirmed by ribotyping, with the exception of one sample from which C. difficile could not 191 
be cultured. 192 
Ribotyping may show limited information in terms of resolution, as outbreak and non-outbreak 193 
related isolates with the same ribotype cannot be diff rentiated. Therefore, we conducted an 194 
analysis using whole genome sequencing. Phylogenetic analysis of all C. difficile 027 isolates 195 
confirmed that all outbreak isolates (samples CdBe01-2 ) are very closely related, being identical 196 
across the whole genome with the exception of 1-3 SNP differences, seen in six isolates (Figure 197 
2). Seven further ribotype 027 isolates were identifi d during 2017 (samples CdBe21-27), which 198 
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showed over 30 SNP differences to the outbreak strain, suggesting that these are unlikely to be 199 
direct transmissions; they also were not epidemiolog cally linked.  200 
 201 
Discussion 202 
Several hospitals in our network were affected by this outbreak caused by a single clone of C. 203 
difficile 027, a ribotype not identified in a nationwide point-prevalence study the year before.  204 
In order to facilitate implementation, we opted fora lean intervention bundle to counter this 205 
outbreak: focusing on raising awareness of this hypervirulent ribotype, harmonizing the 206 
diagnostic approach, strict hand hygiene, and sporicidal cleaning. 207 
Stool samples of two of the earliest patients had tested positive for C. difficile by Immunocard 208 
toxin testing three weeks before their confirmation as ribotype 027. Most likely they would have 209 
been identified as suffering from C. difficile 027, had adequate diagnostic methods been 210 
employed. This delayed the recognition of the outbreak and thus enabled spreading of the 211 
hypervirulent ribotype, as indicated by missing epid miological links among some of the first 212 
patients. Standardizing the lab diagnostic procedur allowed identification of stool samples with 213 
a possible 027 strain, which was confirmed by WGS in all cases but one. Detailed phylogenetic 214 
analysis using WGS based data revealed that 20 isolate  fell within three SNPs of the reference 215 
case, which is highly suggestive of transmission of the outbreak clone between individual cases.  216 
Transmission most probably occurred through contamin ted hands of healthcare workers, as few 217 
patients had direct contact among each other. In several cases, being admitted to the same unit as 218 
an infected patient, but not in the same room, even for less than 24 hours, was sufficient for 219 
transmission. Residual spores not eliminated by terminal cleaning may have been another way of 220 
transmission.  221 
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Unfortunately, we could not determine how and when this pathogen was introduced into our 222 
healthcare system. Ribotype 027 is the most common C. difficile ribotype reported in European 223 
countries besides Switzerland [10]. However, the standard screening of repatriated patients 224 
arriving in our hospital currently does not include C. difficile, so we have insufficient insight into 225 
transmission dynamics. 226 
In order not to undermine adherence to our modified contact precautions (which does not require 227 
gloves or gowning unless if anticipating contact with bodily fluids [11]), we did not require glove 228 
use for every contact with a CDI patient, nor did we enforce hand washing with soap and water 229 
instead of our alcoholic handrub. This decision was taken despite the fact that handrub alcohol 230 
does not kill C. difficile spores.  231 
According to the 2018 IDSA clinical practice guidelin s for C. difficile infection, in endemic 232 
settings, either soap and water or an alcohol-based han  hygiene product can be used (strong 233 
recommendation, moderate quality of evidence), whereas in outbreaks, hand hygiene with soap 234 
and water should be given preference (weak recommendation, low quality of evidence) [12]. 235 
Likewise, the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Study Group 236 
for C. difficile recommends switching from alcohol-based handrub to hand washing in outbreak 237 
settings (conditional recommendation, very low quality of evidence), as well as using gloves and 238 
gowns (strong recommendation, very low quality of evid nce) [13].  239 
Despite these recommendations, we felt that there was no need for stepping up and propagating 240 
general glove use or hand washing with water and soap prior to leaving the patient room, as the 241 
installed bundle halted the outbreak. 242 
Daily sporicidal cleaning of affected patients’ rooms and one-time sporicidal cleaning of entire 243 
wards with possible transmission proved to be sufficient to substantially reduce hospital-acquired 244 
CDI, as described in one other report [14]. 245 
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Other reported C. difficile 027 outbreaks were controlled with: terminal cleaning [15] or cleaning 246 
of an entire facility [16] including adjacent rooms upon discharge of a CDI patient [17]; efficient 247 
case identification and treatment [18-20]; isolating CDI patients in single rooms [19, 20] or on a 248 
dedicated ward [18, 21]; isolating patients with diarrhoea until C. difficile was ruled out [21]; and 249 
restricting fluoroquinolone use [18-21]. Some reports describe the successful use of hydrogen 250 
peroxide for environmental disinfection [19], also as a vaporized preparation [17, 20], or 251 
chlorine-containing disinfectants [20, 21]. In contrast, daily cleaning of a CDI patient’s room and 252 
of the bedpan cleaning area with non-sporicidal disinfectants (chloride concentration < 1000 253 
p.p.m.) actually increased CDI incidence in one report [22]. Selective decontamination of the 254 
digestive tract in ICU patients (using oropharyngeal and intestinal applications of colistin, 255 
tobramycin and amphotericin in combination with systemic cefotaxime during the first two to 256 
four days) during an outbreak also increased CDI risk [19]. Information campaigns to medical 257 
personnel were key in several reports [16, 20, 21, 23]. Most reports, however, stressed reinforcing 258 
hand hygiene [19-21], some also by the affected patients themselve  [18, 20], and wearing gloves 259 
and gowns [19, 20].  260 
To our knowledge, so far no outbreak has been  managed by continuing the usual hand hygiene 261 
with alcoholic solutions and by explicitly refraining from both handwashing with soap and water 262 
as well as default gloving and gowning. Our approach was to facilitate compliance with hand 263 
hygiene by maintaining the usual hand hygiene using alcoholic handrub, as studies suggest that 264 
this approach ensues higher compliance compared with hand washing with soap and water [24]. 265 
Alcoholic handrub can be made more easily available nd its application is less time-consuming. 266 
Potential surface contamination with spores was addressed by sporicidal environmental cleaning. 267 
This is what we decided to label as “lean intervention bundle”, as it was a minimalistic outbreak 268 
management strategy that resorted to few but highly effective measures. Further, given the low 269 
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level of fluoroquinolone utilization in our inpatient setting, we opted against including an 270 
antibiotic stewardship intervention in the bundle of measures to contain this outbreak. 271 
 272 
As for the time being, not all stool samples positive for C. difficile are tested for ribotype 027 in 273 
our country, and because CDI is not a notifiable disease in Switzerland, individual cases may be 274 
missed and the spread of potentially hypervirulent strains underestimated. Therefore, we 275 
recommend establishing a nationwide screening for hypervirulent ribotypes of all C. difficile 276 
positive stool samples, as well as mandatory notifica ion of health authorities.  In case of 277 
clustering of C. difficile cases, WGS is to be employed to check for clonality. 278 
Limitations of our study include the fact that, because of possible lack of clinical vigilance, and 279 
due to the previous absence of testing for ribotype 027 in peripheral hospitals of our network, 280 
related cases prior to the identified index case may have been missed.  281 
 282 
Conclusion 283 
In conclusion, this C. difficile 027 outbreak was caused by a single strain with an unk own 284 
source. Ribotyping alone did not allow strains to be recognized as outbreak clones; this resolution 285 
was achieved by WGS only. The response to this outbreak without gloving and gowning or using 286 
soap and water for hand hygiene, but with sporicidal cleaning, proved to be efficient, and 287 
suggests that such lean intervention bundles may save resources while achieving their goals.  288 
 289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
 293 
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Figure legends 395 
 396 
Figure 1 397 
Epidemiological curve of 027 isolates and interventions 398 
 399 
Figure 2 400 
Phylogeny of C. difficile 027 isolates from this study.  401 
This neighbour joining single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) phylogeny used the assembly of 402 
isolate CdBe02 as a reference (shown in bold), rooted using unrelated 027 isolates. It was 403 
generated in CLC Genomics Workbench 12.0.3 with parameters that differed from the default as: 404 
variant calling with 10x minimum coverage, 10 minimu  count and 70% minimum frequency, 405 
and SNP tree creation with 10x minimum coverage, 10% minimum coverage, 0 prune distance 406 
and including multi-nucleotide variants (MNVs). Outbreak isolates show a diversity of up to 407 
three SNPs from the reference. Specific examples of epidemiological links between outbreak 408 
isolates are superimposed.  409 
 410 
Figure S1 411 
Phylogeny of C. difficile 027 isolates including the external laboratory samples. This 412 
phylogeny used the assembly of isolate CdBe02 as a reference (shown in bold), rooted using 413 
unrelated 027 isolates. Outbreak isolates show a diversity of up to six SNPs from the reference.  414 
 415 
  416 
Manuscript   July 25th, 2020 
19 
 
Figure 1 417 
 418 
 419 
 420 
  421 
Manuscript   July 25th, 2020 
20 
 
  422 
Figure 2        423 
 424 
  425 
Manuscript   July 25th, 2020 
21 
 
Supplement 426 
In order to better understand the outbreak, we collab rated with a private laboratory, 427 
labormedizinisches zentrum Dr. Risch, serving private hospitals and practices in our region. In 428 
this laboratory, stools are screened for the presence of toxigenic Clostridoides difficile using the 429 
algorithm proposed by Fenner et al. [25]. Reactive screening tests are confirmed by PCR 430 
(GeneXpert CDIF®). In case of suspected ribotype 027, the stool specimens are sent to an expert 431 
laboratory for confirmation (AE) using ribotyping and whole genome sequencing. In hospitalized 432 
patients, positive test results prompt timely, automated alerts to the sender as well as the 433 
respective hospital hygiene teams. 434 
Stool samples analysed at the external private laboratory revealed 14 further patients (median age 435 
82.5 years, range 53 to 93 years) belonging to this clu ter. As these outpatients’ charts could not 436 
be accessed, we were unable to analyze the outpatients’ outcomes and epidemiological links 437 
outside of our hospital group.  438 
Only two of these patients had been hospitalized in our hospital group: one patient was admitted 439 
six days after a symptomatic patient into an adjacent ward, the second was managed on the same 440 
ward as another of our patients five months earlier, making a transmission on that ward rather 441 
unlikely. Of these, one patient had diarrhoea after receiving antibiotic therapy as an inpatient, but 442 
was tested for C. difficile only after discharge two weeks later; the second patient was diagnosed 443 
with CDI nine months later. Two other outpatients had been seen at our cardiology outpatient 444 
clinic in late 2016 two and seventeen days after a symptomatic inpatient of this cluster did, 445 
respectively. Of note, the ultrasound examinations were performed by different physicians, so 446 
possible transmissions are suspected to have occurred via fomites.  However, these outpatients 447 
were diagnosed with the outbreak strain 14 months and 17 months after the clinic visit, so an 448 
epidemiological link is uncertain. 449 
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Samples from the external laboratory (CdRi01-12) are shown in Figure S1. 450 
 451 
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